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ABSTRACT 
This study examined abnormal stock market returns to equity holders around 
~orporate contract announcement that were obtained from Dow Jones & Company, 
Inc. between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2000. Of the 7137 contract 
announcement found, 984 contract wining companies (contractee) and 575 contract 
giving companies (contractor) were not contaminated by other announcements and 
have sufficient CRSP data to enter the final sample that was analyzed for excess 
r 
returns to the contractees. Excess returns were also analyzed for the contractors. The 
Asymmettic Information Hypothesis and Information Content Hypothesis were used 
to develop hypotheses that predict contract announcement abnormal returns. The 
Market Model was used to analyze abnormal returns for both the contractees and 
contractors. As expected, statistically significant cumulative average excess returns 
were found for contractee companies, but not for contractor coml?anies. Contractee 
excess returns were also examined for different industry groups. Also, the 
international or domestic nature of the contractor is analyzed for qifferences in 
abnormal returns. Contrary to expectations, the market reacted with more significant 
abnormal return for domestic contracting than the international contracting. Finally, 
cross-sectional regression models are developed to test the statistical significance of 
variables relative to sample characteristic, firm size, profitability, and information 
asymmetries of firm. Contractee relative contract size was found to have significant 
impact on cumulative average abnormal returns. Dummy variables were included in 
the cross-section model to account for the sequence of the contract and nationality of 
the contractee and contractor, but they were statistically insignificant to the model. 
The variables for contractor's firm were also statistically insignificant in effecting 
abnormal returns for their equity. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper uses the event study methodology to empirically examine the effect of 
contract announcement on the market value of equity for both firms entering the 
contract. Capital Market Efficiency Theory suggests if the markets were efficient, 
prices would adjust quickly to all relevant information. In a semi-strong efficient 
capital market, financial markets react in direct proportion to relevant informational 
announcement and stock prices react to all publicly available information. 
While economic and finance literature is replete empirically examined numerous 
types of corporate announcements, like merger and acquisitions, leverage buy-outs, 
joint-ventures, capital structures and dividend payout changes, there have been very 
few empirical studies examine market reaction to contract announcements. Many 
articles have sought to theoretically explain the contractual process from both the 
legal and the mathematical perspective. Most of the empirical studies were in the area 
of asymmetric information and agency theory, and only few are on the market 
reaction to contract announcements. Diltz (1990) empirically examined stock market 
reaction to large contracts between the U.S. Department of Defense and the award-
winning firms. 
This study examines the stock market's reaction to contract announcements between 
publicly traded U.S. corporations, international corporations as the contractee and 
publicly traded U.S. corporations, international corporations as the contractor. It was 
believed that because government contracts are so numerous, they might dominate 
non-government contracts in the analysis. Therefore, government contracts were 
exclude from this study. 
The objective of this study is to examine market reaction to contract announcements 
between listed corporate, using the Market Model and Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP) data (Brown and Warner 1985). Contract announcements are 
expected to convey relevant information to the market about management's 
expectations toward the future investment opportunities of their company. Therefore, 
contract winning companies (contractees) are expected to receive significant positive 
abnormal returns in the announcement period, especially when there were numerous 
bidders, should be seen as good news by the market. Conversely, contract-giving 
companies (contractors) are not expected to earn significant abnormal returns around 
the announcement period. The market is expected to see the giving of a contract as 
the n01mal course of business of the contractors. 
This study will categorize international contracts from purely domestic ones. The 
market is expected to react positively to a USA corporation entering an international 
contract, which should be a sign of a company that is either staiting to, or continuing 
to diversity internationally. It should be a good sign, hence excess returns ai·e 
expected. From the contractor's point of view, international business is usually 
viewed as more risky than strictly domestic business. Therefore, if a contractor is 
willing to take on the additional risks of an international contract, the international 
contract announcement should convey important information about the contractors' 
expectations concerning the future investment opportunities of the contractee. Also, 
there could be information asymmetries and monopolies that caused the contractor to 
go international. In either case, the market is expected to react with greater excess 
returns for the international contract than those for the domestic one. 
Market reaction to the contract announcement will depend on the nature of the 
industry group in which the firm is operating. Capital Market theory indicate that the 
existence of information asymmetry in different market segments, such as service vs 
non-service firm, will cause the market to react more strongly under certain 
circumstances. A firm in a high technology industry wining a contract is expected to 
receive greater abnormal return than that low technology one, because of information 
asymmetries and monopolies. 
The Market Model will also be used to analyze the difference in excess returns for 
different relative contract sizes. Relative contract size will be the ratio of the dollar 
value of the contract, to the total assets of the firm one year prior to the contract 
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announcement. The market is expected to be influenced by the relative contract size. 
The announcement of a large company winning a large contract should not convey the 
same information as a smaller company winning an equivalently large contract. 
When a small firm wining a large contract, abnormal returns are expected for a large 
relative contract size, which should be signifying that the contractor is confident that 
the smaller company can perform the large contract. 
Finally, cross-sectional regress10n models will be developed to analyze which 
variables are good predictors of expected excess returns. As already mentioned, firm 
size and relative contract size are expected to be good predictors of cumulative excess 
returns in the stock market. Both contractee and contractor Cumulative Average 
Excess Returns (CAER) will be the dependent variable, and a cross-sectional 
regression will be done on both contractee and contractor samples. For both the 
contractee and contractor sample, the regression will include dummy variables 
indicative of the international aspects, and the announcement sequence of the 
contractee and contractor. 
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